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 Joinder of equitable assignors of equitable 
and legal choses in action 
 CH Tham * 
 It is commonly accepted that equitable assignees of equitable choses in action 
may sue obligors of such choses without joining the assignors, and that joinder of 
equitable assignors of legal choses arising from contract may also be dispensed 
with, given William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co . This article 
suggests that the former results from the application of res judicata  principles 
by a court acting within its equitable jurisdiction, and that Brandt’s  is better 
understood as having been decided within the court’s equitable jurisdiction. 
Consequently, this paper shows that the law on joinder of equitable assignors is 
consistent with a non-transfer conception of equitable assignments predicated on 
a continuing trustee-benefi ciary relation between assignor and assignee, albeit 
one that is augmented by an unusual principal-agent relationship between the 
assignor and assignee. 
 I.  THE CONUNDRUM OF  BRANDT’S 
 Where A expressly constitutes herself trustee of the benefi t of a legal chose in action such 
as a debt arising from a contract between herself and B for the benefi t of C, C may not 
bring proceedings against B to obtain a common law remedy without joining A.  1  Hence:  2  
 * Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
 The following abbreviations are used: 
 Ashburner (1933) : D Browne (ed.),  Ashburner’s Principles of Equity , 2nd edn (Butterworth & Co, London, 1933; 
 Blackstone (1765) : W Blackstone,  Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1765) Book 2; 
 Coke (1788) :  Coke on Littleton , 13th edn (T Wright, London, 1788); 
 Edelman & Elliott (2015) : J Edelman and S Elliott, “Two conceptions of equitable assignment” (2015) 131 LQR 228; 
 Guest (2015) : AG Guest and YK Liew,  Guest on the law of assignment , 2nd edn (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015; 
 Handley (2009) : KR Handley,  Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata , 4th edn (LexisNexis, London, 2009; 
 Judicature Act 1873, or Judicature Act: Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873; 
 LPA 1925: Law of Property Act 1925; 
 Meagher, Gummow & Lehane (2015) : JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG Turner ,  Meagher, Gummow and 
Lehane's Equity Doctrines and Remedies , 5th edn (LexisNexis Butterworths, New South Wales, 2015); 
 Smith & Leslie (2013) : M Smith and N Leslie,  The Law of Assignment , 2nd edn (OUP, Oxford, 2013); 
 Tham (2016a) : CH Tham, “The Mechanics of Equitable Assignments: One Engine or Two?”, in J Edelman, 
S Degeling and J Goudkamp (eds),  Contract in Commercial Law (Law Book Co, Sydney, 2016); 
 Tham (2016b) : CH Tham, “The Mechanics of Assignments: Functions and Form” (DPhil thesis, University 
of Oxford, 2016); 
 Tolhurst (2016) : GJ Tolhurst,  The Assignment of Contractual Rights , 2nd edn (Hart, Oxford, 2016). 
 1 .  Gregory v  Williams (1817) 3 Mer 582, 589–590; 36 ER 224, 227. 
 2 .  AW Scott, ML Ascher and WF Fratcher,  Scott and Ascher on Trusts , 5th edn (Aspen, New York, 2006), 
ch.28, § 28.1, at 1925–1926, cited with approval in  Roberts  v  Gill & Co [2010] UKSC 22; [2011] 1 AC 240, 
[55] (Lord Collins). 
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 “It is the trustee rather than the benefi ciary who is entitled to maintain actions against third parties 
who … fail to pay debts held in trust. [But i]f the trustee improperly fails to bring such an action, 
the benefi ciaries can compel the trustee by a suit in equity to do so, and, in order to settle the whole 
matter in a single suit, they can join the third party [tortfeasor or debtor] as a co-defendant.” 
 Which is to say, employing the “ Vandepitte procedure”,  3  if A refused to bring the action at 
law against B on C’s request, C may sue in equity to compel A to do so,  4  joining such suit 
in equity against A to A’s common law action  5  against B.  6  
 Given Lord Collins’ observation in  Roberts v Gill & Co  7  that “in the case of an equitable 
assignment the assignee is the true owner and the assignor is a bare trustee” the position 
should be no different if A equitably assigned  8  the benefi t of her legal chose with B to C. 
However, this proposition appears to be contradicted by  William Brandt’s Sons & Co v 
Dunlop Rubber Co .  9  
 In that case, Kramrisch & Co (“Kramrisch”) had sold rubber to the respondents 
(“Dunlops”). Financing for Kramrisch’s rubber had been provided by the appellants 
(“Brandt’s”), in consideration for which Kramrisch assigned to Brandt’s the price payable 
by Dunlops for that rubber. Brandt’s gave notice of the assignment to Dunlops’ offi ce 
in Birmingham, and also requested that payment of the price be made to it and not to 
Kramrisch. But, owing to an internal miscommunication, Dunlops’ accounts department 
in London was not informed. Payment was tendered to another fi rm, Kleinworts & Co, 
which had fi nanced another, unrelated, consignment of rubber that Dunlops had purchased 
from Kramrisch. No payment being forthcoming from Dunlops,  10  Brandt’s, as assignee 
of the debt, sued Dunlops. But Kramrisch was not joined, perhaps because it was being 
wound up. 
 At fi rst instance,  11  Kramrisch’s non-joinder was a non-issue as the assignment to Brandt’s 
was held to have satisfi ed the requirements under the Judicature Act 1873, s.25(6)  12  and, 
by force of statute, Kramrisch’s entitlement to bring judicial proceedings against Dunlops 
would have passed to Brandt’s. However, this was reversed when the Court of Appeal  13  
held that there had been no effective assignment at all. On further appeal, the House of 
  3 .  Named after  Vandepitte  v  Preferred Accident Insurance Corp of New York (1933) 44 Ll L Rep 41; [1933] 
AC 70. 
  4 .  Harmer  v  Armstrong [1934] Ch 65 (CA), 83 (Lord Hanworth MR). 
  5 .  Although the language of “suits” or “bills in equity”, and “actions at law”, is archaic, for ease of 
exposition, this article will use “suit” or “bill” to refer to proceedings in the court’s equitable jurisdiction (being 
proceedings in which equitable remedies are sought), reserving “action” for proceedings in its common law 
jurisdiction (being proceedings in which common law remedies are sought). 
  6 .  Harmer  v  Armstrong [1934] Ch 65 (CA), 84;  Barbados Trust Co Ltd  v  Bank of Zambia [2007] EWCA 
Civ 148;  [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep 495 , [45]. 
  7 .  [2010] UKSC 22; [2011] 1 AC 240, [68]. See also:  Winch  v  Keeley (1787) 1 TR 619, 623; 99 ER 1284, 
1286;  Warner Bros Records Inc  v  Rollgreen Ltd [1976] 1 QB 430, 443–444 (Roskill LJ). 
  8 .  Statutory (sometimes termed “legal”) assignments pursuant to LPA 1925, s.136(1) do not share this 
problem. 
  9 .  [1905] AC 454 (hereafter, “ Brandt’s ”). 
 10 .  Dunlops may have made further payments to Kramrisch. The ramifi cations of such payment, if made, are 
discussed  post , fn.144. 
 11 .  (1903) 8 Com Cas 174, 174; (1903) 90 LT 106, 107. 
 12 .  Re-enacted as LPA 1925, s.136(1). 
 13 .  [1904] 1 KB 387. 
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Lords held that, even if there had been no valid statutory assignment, the evidence showed 
that Kramrisch had validly effected an equitable assignment in Brandt’s favour. 
 As to the question of joining the assignor to proceedings initiated by an equitable 
assignee, Earl Halsbury LC agreed with Lord Macnaghten that:  14  
 “Strictly speaking, Kramrisch & Co or their trustee in bankruptcy, should have been brought before 
the court. But no action is now dismissed for want of parties, and the trustee in bankruptcy had really 
no interest in the matter. At your Lordships’ bar the [sic] Dunlops disclaimed any wish to have him 
present, and in both Courts below they claimed to retain for their own use any balance that might 
remain after satisfying Brandts.” 
 Dunlops having declined to raise the objection, Kramrisch’s non-joinder was taken by 
the House of Lords to pose no further obstacle to granting the order sought by Brandt’s, 
namely, an order requiring Dunlops to pay the sums in question to it. 
 Brandt’s has usually been taken to have concluded that joinder of the equitable assignor 
to a common law action may be dispensed with on the assumption that this order had been 
made within the court’s common law jurisdiction.  15  For example, relying on  Brandt’s , and 
other authorities that appeared to have followed it,  16  Peter Gibson LJ concluded in  Three 
Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 1)  17  that: 
 “[t]hese authorities … clearly establish that the equitable assignee can be regarded realistically as 
the person entitled to the assigned chose and is able to sue the debtor on that chose, but that save in 
special circumstances the court will require him to join the assignor as a procedural requirement so 
that the assignor might be bound and the debtor protected.” 
 And even more recently, relying on Brandt’s, as well as the authority of  EM Bowden’s 
Patents Syndicate Ltd v Herbert Smith & Co ,  18   Performing Right Society, Ltd v London 
Theatre of Varieties Ltd,  19  Vandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance Corporation of 
New York  20  and  Harmer v Armstrong ,  21  Lord Collins observed that, “[t]he starting point is 
that if an equitable assignee sues a third party, the assignor must be joined as defendant 
…”, 
 22 
 whilst accepting Viscount Cave LC’s statement in  Performing Right Society Ltd v 
London Theatre of Varieties Ltd  23  that this was not an invariable rule.  24  
 Relying on the authority of  Three Rivers District Council , inter alia, some have been 
led to suppose that:  25  
 14 .  [1905] AC 454, 462. 
 15 .  Brandt’s proceedings were reported as having been by way of “action”. 
 16 .  Namely,  Performing Right Society Ltd  v  London Theatre of Varieties Ltd [1924] AC 1;  Central Insurance 
Co Ltd  v  Seacalf Shipping Co (The Aiolos)  [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 25 ;  Weddell  v  JA Pearce & Major [1988] Ch 26; 
 Deposit Protection Board  v  Dalia [1994] 2 AC 367, 387–388 (Sir Michael Fox). 
 17 .  [1996] QB 292, 313F–G (emphasis added). Waite LJ agreed with him on this point. 
 18 .  [1904] 2 Ch 86, 91 (Warrington J); aff’d on appeal [1904] 2 Ch 122. 
 19 .  [1924] AC 1, 13–14 (Viscount Cave LC), 19–20 (Viscount Finlay), 29 (Lord Sumner). 
 20 .  [1933] AC 70, 79 (Lord Wright). 
 21 .  [1934] Ch 65, 82 (Lord Hanworth MR). 
 22 .  [2010] UKSC 22; [2011] 1 AC 240, [64] 
 23 .  [1924] AC 1, 14. 
 24 .  Roberts  v  Gill & Co [2010] UKSC 22; [2011] 1 AC 240, [65]. 
 25 .  Guest (2015) , [3.08] (emphasis in original, references omitted). 
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 “… [t]he better view now … is that the equitable assignee has a cause of action in his own right, 
being a cause of action in equity, which he can enforce on his own[, but t]his [equitable] cause of 
action is not merely to obtain an equitable remedy, such as specifi c performance or an injunction. It 
entitles the assignee to claim a common law remedy such as a debt or damages.” 
 Yet the means by which an equitable cause of action may lead to the grant of a common 
law remedy is obscure. As the editors of Meagher, Gummow and Lehane have trenchantly 
noted, “How a person not the legal owner can, the Judicature Act [1873] notwithstanding, 
prosecute what is, in effect, an action at common law for damages is not explained.”  26  The 
implication is that English law on the point is incoherent. 
 Some attempts to rationalise Brandt’s have, however, been made. In  Three Rivers 
District Council , Staughton LJ rejected the proposition that an equitable assignment of 
a legal chose vests the assignee with an equitable chose in action which “prevails” over 
the common law chose in action.  27  Consequently, it has been suggested that application of 
the  Vandepitte procedure explains why equitable assignors need not be joined.  28  But that 
cannot be, as the logic of the  Vandepitte procedure as applied to a common law action 
requires joinder of the assignor.  29  
 Alternatively, it has been suggested that the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 (hereafter, 
the “1854 Act”) may provide an explanation.  30  But this is also diffi cult, given the operative 
provisions in the 1854 Act which, in this context, appear to be ss 79, 82, 83 and 85.  31  
 Sections 79 and 82 empowered common law courts to grant injunctions restraining the 
repetition, continuance or committal of a breach of contract; whereas a debtor who was 
being or under threat of being sued at law, or who was suing another at law, was permitted 
by ss 83 and 85 respectively to plead in that action such facts as would have justifi ed 
the grant of a common injunction as a “defence on equitable grounds” or a “replication 
on equitable grounds”. Before the Judicature Act, these provisions obviated the need 
to initiate parallel proceedings to obtain judicial orders that had hitherto been within 
Chancery’s exclusive remit, but they did not address the question of joinder.  32  
 Perhaps:   33  
 “[t]he short answer is that, as a result of the two House of Lords cases,  William Brandt’s Sons & Co 
v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd and  Performing Right Society Ltd v London Theatre of Varieties Ltd it is 
clearly established that any requirement of joinder is procedural and not substantive.” 
 26 .  Meagher, Gummow & Lehane (2015) , [6.520]. 
 27 .  [1996] QB 292, 393. 
 28 .  M Smith, “Locus standi and the enforcement of legal claims by cestuis que trust and assignees” (2008) 22 
TruLI 140;  Smith & Leslie (2013) , [11.43–11.47]. 
 29 .  As noted in  Meagher, Gummow & Lehane (2015) , [6.520]. 
 30 .  A Tettenborn, “Assignments, Trusts, Property and Obligations”, in JW Neyers, R Bronaugh and SGA 
Pitel (eds),  Exploring Contract Law (Hart, Oxford, 2009), at 273, n.17. See also  Tolhurst (2016) , [4.09]. 
 31 .  These provisions were repealed by the Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act 1883. However, the 
common law courts’ statutory powers granted thereby were, it seems, preserved by the Judicature Act 1873, s.16, 
which transferred the entirety of the common law courts’ jurisdiction to the High Court. For authority that ss 79 
and 82 have been preserved thusly, see  Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Company  v  Beall (1882) 20 Ch 
D 501 (CA). The effect of s.83 may also have been duplicated by the Judicature Act 1873, s.24(5), subsequently 
re-enacted  in pari materia in the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, s.41 but now implicitly 
encapsulated within the Senior Courts Act 1981, s.49. 
 32 .  See also  Guest (2015) , [3.07]. 
 33 .  Guest (2015 ), [3.17] (references omitted). 
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 If so, the House of Lords would have overturned the substantive reasons at common 
law for requiring joinder of the assignor, ie that only contracting parties may sue on the 
contract at law,  34  and only contractual promisees who had provided consideration may sue 
on the contract at law.  35  But has English law developed to such a stage? 
 Scepticism as to whether the decisions in  Brandt’s and  Performing Right Society had 
changed the substantive rules at common law in this manner, or at all, is merited given 
Lord Collins’ speech in  Roberts v Gill & Co , which referred only to  Performing Right 
Society as authority for the proposition that joinder might not be invariably necessary. 
Since that was a decision of the court acting within its equitable and not its common law 
jurisdiction,  36  perhaps the substantive principle that mandates joinder when proceedings 
are brought within the court’s common law jurisdiction is not applicable when proceedings 
are brought without requiring recourse to that common law jurisdiction? 
 Drawing on the above, this article suggests that  Brandt’s was decided entirely within 
the court’s equitable jurisdiction. So understood,  Brandt’s is no anomaly signalling a 
move away from a trust-based conception of equitable assignment  37  to a “substitutive” 
conception of assignment involving substitution of the equitable assignee in place of the 
equitable assignor.  38  Consequently, echoing a suggestion made by Professor Tolhurst  39  
(though for rather different reasons), this article suggests that joinder of the assignor is 
a substantive requirement whenever the court’s common law jurisdiction is invoked; but, 
where only the court’s equitable jurisdiction is invoked, the requirement for joinder of the 
assignor will be merely procedural. 
 Demonstration of the equitable basis for Brandt’s requires, fi rst, appreciating that 
equitable assignments of both equitable and legal choses work by way of a bare trustee-
benefi ciary relationship twinned with an unusual principal-agent relationship between the 
assignor and her assignee. These twinned relationships, and their “trust” and “agency” 
effects, are recognised by the court within both its equitable and common law jurisdictions. 
However, these trust and agency effects are only given effect to (ie, “enforced”) by 
the issuance of originating process and judicial remedies within the court’s equitable 
jurisdiction. In contrast, the court will neither grant any common law remedies nor allow 
the issuance of any originating process to commence common law proceedings on the 
application of a mere equitable assignee, for doing so within its common law jurisdiction 
would be tantamount to enforcing equitable doctrine inconsistently with common law 
principle. The rules of  res judicata pertaining to issue estoppel therefore lead to different 
 34 .  Tweddle  v  Atkinson (1861) 1 B & S 393; 121 ER 762;  Gandy  v  Gandy (1884) 30 Ch D 57, 69;  Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v  Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 240, 246;  Scruttons Ltd  v  Midland Silicones Ltd  [1961] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep 365 ; [1962] AC 446;  Homburg Houtimport BV v  Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2003] UKHL 
12;  [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 571 ; [2003] 1 AC 715. 
 35 .  See note (e) in  Barber  v  Fox (1682) 2 Wms Saund 136, 137; 85 ER 860, 867;  Thomas  v  Thomas (1842) 2 
QB 851, 859;  Tweddle  v  Atkinson (1861) 1 B & S 393, 398 and 399; 121 ER 762, 763 and 764. 
 36 .  Plainly so, as the only remedy sought was the equitable remedy of injunction, the claim for damages 
having been abandoned. 
 37 .  See, eg:  Blackstone (1765) , Ch 30, at 442;  Coke (1788) , at folio 232b, note (1) by C Butler;  Smith & Leslie 
(2013) , [11.11–11.12];  Edelman & Elliott (2015) ;  Tham (2016a) ;  Tham (2016b) . 
 38 .  See, eg: AL Corbin, “Assignment of Contract Rights” (1926) 74 U of Pennsylvania L Rev 207, 208–209; 
MG Bridge,  Personal Property Law , 4th edn (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015), 231. 
 39 .  G Tolhurst, “Equitable assignment of legal rights: a resolution to a conundrum” (2002) 118 LQR 98. See 
also  Tolhurst (2016) , Ch 4. 
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results depending on whether one is concerned with the court’s equitable or common law 
jurisdiction, and this results in differences in the requirements for joinder of the assignor. 
 II. EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENTS: TRUST AND AGENCY 
 Equitable assignment is a  sui generis doctrine which allows for the benefi t of a legal or 
equitable chose in action to be both enjoyed and exercised by the assignee. It achieves this 
through two mechanisms. 
 First, equitable assignments of any chose in action, whether legal or equitable, entail 
a “trust effect”: a trustee-benefi ciary relationship invariably arises between assignor and 
assignee. Second, equitable assignments of any chose in action also entail an “agency 
effect”: every such assignment entails delegation by the assignor to her assignee of her 
entitlements (powers) against the obligor to the chose assigned in a manner akin to that 
between a principal and her agent, albeit one where the agent is released from the usual 
fi duciary obligations normally associated with such relationships. Equitable assignments 
are, accordingly, a  sui generis institution that may be distinguished from the institution of 
the trust, or the institution of agency, although its end results share some similarities with 
both of those institutions when each is combined with the other. 
 In  Re McArdle ,  40  Jenkins LJ pointed out that, following an equitable assignment, “the 
assignee is entitled to demand payment from the trustee or holder of the [trust] fund, and 
the trustee is bound to make payment to the assignee, with no further act on the part of the 
assignor remaining to be done to perfect the assignee’s title”. In opposition to the “trust-
plus-agency” conception of equitable assignment, this could be explained on grounds that 
the equitable assignor of an equitable chose “drops out” or retains “no interest” following 
the assignment. Indeed, in  Cator v Croydon Canal Co ,  41  a case concerning sums of money 
assessed to be due under certain statutes for the compulsory acquisition of and damage 
to lands in the course of constructing a canal linking Croydon to the Surrey Grand Canal, 
Lord Cottenham LC said: 
 “It is quite clear that, where the assignor has a legal title and he assigns his interest, and any 
proceedings are taken by the assignee with respect to the property so assigned, the assignor must be 
a party to the suit, because, by his assignment, he does not part with the legal estate, and the person 
having the legal estate must be before the Court. But that principle clearly does not apply to the 
facts of this case. There was no sum awarded specifi cally to this gentleman, Mr Scott. All that he 
had was an equitable interest—an equitable title to be paid the sum of money if he made out his title 
to the land [acquired and damaged by the defendant company]. That equitable interest and right he 
assigned before the suit [by the assignee]; he parted, therefore, with all interest, and, having parted 
with all interest of every description, of course it was not necessary that he should have been a party 
to these proceedings.” 
 This passage could be understood as expounding a standalone principle that equitable 
assignments of equitable choses entail the “dropping out” of the assignee and so, cannot 
entail any form of sub-trust by which the assignor holds the benefi t of her equitable 
 40 .  [1951] 1 Ch 669, 677. See also  Donaldson  v  Donaldson (1854) Kay 711, 718–719; 69 ER 303, 306–307. 
 41 .  (1843) 4 Y & C Ex 593, 593–594; 160 ER 1149–1150. 
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interest in the subject matter of the assignment for the assignee. That view would concede 
that equitable assignments operate differently, depending on whether the chose assigned 
was equitable, or legal.  42  However, such concession is contrary to principle and authority. 
 A. The “trust effect”: the argument from principle 
 Apart from the authorities (which will be discussed below), in principle, equitable 
assignments of equitable or legal choses cannot entail substitution of the assignee in place 
of the assignor. If that were so, the rule in  Dearle v Hall  43  could never have developed in 
the way it has done. 
 Under the rule in  Dearle v Hall , where the benefi t of a chose in action (whether equitable 
or legal)  44  has been equitably assigned for value  45  multiple times in an inconsistent manner, 
each assignee’s claim is ranked in the order by which the obligor had been given notice 
of each assignment,  46  save for assignees who had knowledge (actual or constructive)  47  of 
any prior assignment(s) at the time when value had been given.  48  Leaving aside detailed 
analysis of the rule for another time, it is clear that the rule could not have arisen if the 
effect of an equitable assignment per se was to substitute the assignee in place of the 
assignor since that would render otiose the giving of notice. 
 Suppose B held the legal fee simple in Blackacre on a special trust for A for her life: 
B would be duty-bound to pay the income generated from Blackacre to A for so long as 
she lived. Suppose A equitably assigned the benefi t of her equitable life interest to C1 (for 
value) on 1 January, and then purported to equitably assign the same again to C2 (also for 
value) on 2 January, C2 being ignorant of C1’s prior dealings of A. Suppose, also, that C2 
then gave notice to B of her dealings with A on 12 January, whereas C1 gave notice to B 
of his dealings with A on 22 January. On these facts, were C1 to bring proceedings against 
B seeking an order requiring B to pay over the Blackacre income to him instead of to A, 
and if C2 were to bring similar proceedings, but seeking an order for B to pay the income 
to C2 instead of to A, B would be ordered to pay the income to C2 in priority to C1 under 
the rule in  Dearle v Hall .  49  
 42 .  Edelman & Elliott (2015) , 246–247. See also  Guest (2015) , [3.07];  Smith & Leslie (2013) , [11.05] and 
[11.09]. 
 43 .  (1828) 3 Russ 1; 38 ER 475. 
 44 .  Dearle  v  Hall concerned competing equitable assignments of an equitable interest arising under a 
testamentary trust. But the same rule has been applied to cases of competing equitable assignments of legal 
choses in action such as contractual debts:  E Pfeiffer Weinkellerei-Weineinkauf GmbH & Co  v  Arbuthnot Factors 
Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 150, 163;  Compaq Computer Ltd  v  Abercorn Group Ltd [1991] BCC 484 (Ch), 500. 
 45 .  The rule has no application to voluntary equitable assignments:  Justice  v  Wynne (1860) 12 Ir Ch Rep 289 
(Irish CA in Chancery);  Re Wallis [1902] 1 KB 719, 720. See also  United Bank of Kuwait Plc  v  Sahib [1997] Ch 
107, 119 (Chadwick J); decision affd  ibid (CA). 
 46 .  This is the “fi rst limb” of the rule in  Dearle  v  Hall . 
 47 .  Spencer  v  Clarke (1878) 9 Ch D 137;  Re Weniger’s Policy [1910] 2 Ch 291. Knowledge of a prior 
assignment acquired after giving value but before the subsequent assignee gives notice is immaterial:  Mutual 
Life Assurance Society  v  Langley (1886) 32 Ch D 460. 
 48 .  This is the “second limb” of the rule in  Dearle  v  Hall . This qualifi cation to the rule’s fi rst limb was 
mentioned in  Foster  v  Blackstone (1833) 1 My & K 297, 306–307; 39 ER 694, 697–698;  Timson  v  Ramsbottom 
(1836) 2 Keen 35, 50; 48 ER 541, 547;  Ward  v  Duncombe [1893] AC 369, 384 (Lord Macnaghten). For doubts 
as to the second limb, see John De Lacy, “Refl ections on the ambit of the rule in  Dearle  v  Hall and the priority 
of personal property assignments—Part 1” (1999) 28 Anglo-Am LR 87, 114–131. 
 49 .  The position would be identical if the chose assigned were legal: see  supra , fn.44. 
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 If the equitable assignment substituted the assignee in place of the assignor as obligee to 
the obligation pertaining to the chose assigned, A would have had no life interest in the fee 
simple in Blackacre as of 2 January: that life interest would have been C1’s. Consequently, 
it would be immaterial that C2 had given notice of his dealings with A prior to C1’s doing 
the same. The fact that the rule in  Dearle v Hall came to be applied to multiple confl icting 
equitable assignments of legal and equitable choses in action demonstrates, therefore, 
that equitable assignment of an equitable chose did not have the effect of substituting the 
assignee in place of the assignor as obligee to the chose assigned. And the fact that the rule 
persists  50  tells us that that remains the law today.  51  
 B. The “trust effect”: the argument from authority 
 (a) Authorities supporting the “trust effect” when equitable choses are equitably assigned: 
Kekewich v Manning  (1851) and the cases cited therein 
 Some might argue that the rule in  Dearle v Hall represents an unprincipled and anomalous 
exception and so may be disregarded as proof that equitable assignors of equitable choses 
do not drop out. But the proposition that equitable assignors of equitable choses do not 
drop out is reinforced by the cases which accept that equitable assignments of equitable 
choses in action entail a trustee-benefi ciary relationship between assignor and assignee. If 
correct, the equitable assignor cannot “drop out”. 
 In  Kekewich v Manning ,  52  Knight Bruce LJ held that a voluntary deed equitably assigning 
an equitable interest was effective upon execution. Knight Bruce LJ relied heavily on 
the important case of  Sloane v Cadogan ,  53  where Sir William Grant MR had come to 
precisely the same conclusion. Crucially, Knight Bruce LJ observed that, “…  Fortescue 
v Barnett [ 54 ] …,  Wheatley v Purr [ 55 ] and  Blakeley v Brady [ 56 ] … have, without question, 
followed  Cadogan v Sloane , and if it could require support supported it”.  57  
 In  Wheatley v Purr , the holder of a deposit account with a bank constituted herself 
trustee of that legal chose so arising for the benefi t of her intended donee by way of gift. 
When the donor died, the balance in the account was paid to her personal representative. 
Lord Langdale MR held that the donor’s trust devolved to the personal representative, who 
held the monies received in discharge of the bank’s indebtedness on trust for the donee. 
 50 .  Although the rule was criticised in  Ward  v  Duncombe [1893] AC 369, the House of Lords declined to 
overrule it. 
 51 .  Parliament having extended the rule in  Dearle v  Hall to apply to mortgages of equitable interests in land 
(see LPA 1925, s.137(1)), a nice question arises whether the rule may now be abolished other than by statute. 
 52 .  (1851) 1 De G M & G 176; 42 ER 519. 
 53 .  The decision was fi rst reported in Sir Edward Sugden,  A Practical Treatise of the Law of Vendors and 
Purchasers of Estates , 11th edn (S Sweet, London, 1846), 1119. Portions of  Sloane  v  Cadogan are summarised 
in Sir L Shadwell V-C’s decision in  Beatson  v  Beatson (1841) 12 Sim 281, 291–294; 59 ER 1139, 1143–1144, 
though he appears to have misunderstood its import: SJ Bailey, “Assignments of debts in England from the 
twelfth to the twentieth century—Part III” (1932) 48 LQR 547, 558. Consequently, the reasoning in  Beatson  v 
 Beatson was rejected by the Court of Appeal in Chancery in  Donaldson v  Donaldson (1854) Kay 711; 69 ER 
303. 
 54 .  (1834) 3 My & K 36; 40 ER 1557. 
 55 .  (1837) 1 Keen 551; 48 ER 419. 
 56 .  (1839) 2 Drury & Walsh 311 (Ireland, High Ct of Chancery). 
 57 .  Kekewich  v  Manning (1851) 1 De G M & G 176, 194; 42 ER 519, 526–527 (references omitted). 
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 Fortescue v Barnett involved a gratuitous equitable assignment  58  in 1813 of the benefi t 
of a life assurance policy by the assured to assignees to hold on trusts declared by the 
assured; whereas  Blakeley v Brady involved a gratuitous equitable assignment of a debt 
to assignees to hold on trusts specifi ed by the assignor. When the assured in  Fortescue 
surrendered the policy, Sir John Leach MR ordered him to account to his assignees for 
the value of the policy that had been assigned together with all bonuses which had been, 
might be, or would have been declared, but for such surrender. As for  Blakely , when 
the administrator of the assignor accepted monies tendered by the debtor in discharge of 
the debt that had been assigned, Lord Plunkett LC held that the administrator held such 
monies “in trust”  59  for the benefi t of the assignee. 
 Fortescue and  Blakely therefore recognised that a voluntary equitable assignment of a 
legal chose entails a trustee-benefi ciary relationship between the assignor and the assignee. 
Since “you may constitute a trustee for a volunteer”,  60  equitable assignments of the legal 
choses in those cases were effective without need for consideration because they entailed 
a trust.  61  However, in taking  Sloane v Cadogan (which concerned an equitable assignment 
of an equitable chose) to have been followed and was supported by  Wheatley ,  Fortescue 
and  Blakely , Knight Bruce LJ must have reasoned that equitable assignments of legal or 
equitable choses both entailed a similar trustee-benefi ciary relationship between assignor 
and assignee.  62   Kekewich v Manning therefore refutes the proposition that equitable 
assignments of equitable choses, unlike equitable assignments of legal choses, do not 
entail a trustee-benefi ciary relationship between assignor and assignee. 
 (b) Subsequent authorities (apparently) denying the “trust effect” 
 Kekewich v Manning is “the leading case on this subject”.  63  No subsequent case has ever 
doubted its correctness. And yet, some later judgments contain language which may give 
the impression that equitable assignments of equitable choses do not entail a trustee-
benefi ciary relationship between assignor and assignee at all. In respect of such cases, 
two examples of which will be examined below, coherence with  Kekewich v Manning is 
possible, but only with a more nuanced reading. 
 First, in  Donaldson v Donaldson ,  64  Page Wood V-C concluded that an equitable 
assignor would “drop out” because, following the assignment, the assignor’s interest had 
“completely passed” to the assignee. But in so doing, he expressly relied on the reasoning 
in  Kekewich v Manning , leading him to conclude that “[t]he question is in every case, has 
 58 .  Necessarily equitable as assignments of the benefi t of life assurance policies pursuant to the Policies of 
Assurance Act 1867, s.1 or of choses in action generally pursuant to the Judicature Act 1873, s.25(6) still lay in 
the future. 
 59 .  (1839) 2 Drury & Walsh 311, 328. See also FT White and OD Tudor,  White & Tudor's leading cases in 
equity: with notes , 9th edn (ed EP Hewitt and JB Richardson) (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1928), 797. 
 60 .  Blakely  v  Brady (1839) 2 Drury & Walsh 311, 328, following  Sloane  v  Cadogan . 
 61 .  See also  Re Patrick [1891] 1 Ch 82, 87 (Lindley LJ, explaining  Fortescue  v  Barnett ). 
 62 .  See also  Nanney  v  Morgan (1887) 37 Ch D 346, 355, where Cotton LJ (with whom Sir James Hannen 
and Lopes LJ agreed) pointed out that the assignor of an equitable interest in company shares who subsequently 
became the registered shareholder of those shares, “took [that legal interest in those shares] subject to a trust”. 
 63 .  Re Patrick [1891] 1 Ch 82, 87 (Lindley LJ, with whom Bowen and Fry LJJ agreed). 
 64 .  (1854) Kay 711, 717; 69 ER 303, 306. 
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there been a declaration of trust, or has the assignor done such acts that the donee can take 
advantage of them without requiring any further act to be done by the assignor …”.  65  
 Similar diffi culty may be encountered in  Voyle v Hughes ,  66  in which Stuart V-C had to 
consider whether a gift of an equitable interest could be validly effected by way of a deed 
of assignment. In that case, Stuart V-C noted:  67  
 “If a deed of actual assignment of an equitable interest has any operation in equity as divesting the 
assignor of his equitable right, it is an operation no more in the nature of declaring a trust than any 
other actual conveyance of any equitable estate or interest in real or personal property. Therefore 
there seems no other just view of this case than that which treats the instrument as an actual deed of 
assignment, and not as a mere agreement, or executory instrument.” 
 And yet, almost in the same breath, Stuart V-C had acknowledged that:  68  
 “[I]n the case of  Kekewich v Manning , in which the authorities were reviewed, and in which the 
assignment was held to be valid, notwithstanding the want of valuable consideration, is suffi ciently 
supported by authority, and rests on a sound and intelligible principle.” 
 One resolution for these diffi culties may lie in reading between the lines, taking note of 
what the reports do not say. 
 In  Donaldson v Donaldson , Wood V-C’s reliance on  Kekewich v Manning and the trust-
based analysis therein must denote that an equitable assignor of an equitable chose “drops 
out” only by way of metaphor. Given the trust effect entailed by the equitable assignment, 
the assignor may be said to “lose” her benefi cial interest in the chose assigned in that she is 
no longer benefi cially entitled as against the assignee to invoke her entitlements in the chose 
assigned for her own benefi t. To that extent, she “drops out”, but only in a manner of speaking. 
 As for  Voyle v Hughes , Stuart V-C accepted that the rationale allowing for equitable 
assignments by way of gift in  Kekewich v Manning was correct, preferring it to the reasoning 
in  Meek v Kettlewell ,  69  whilst also denying that such assignment might be characterised 
as a declaration of trust. But perhaps Stuart V-C was rejecting the proposition that a 
validly executed deed assigning the benefi t of a subsisting equitable interest by way of gift 
might be taken to be merely a declaration of trust, and so had implicitly recognised that 
an equitable assignment of an equitable chose entails both trust and the unusual agency 
effects that will be more fully described below.  70  
 The seminal decision of  Kekewich v Manning casts a long shadow. To make sense of 
the subsequent case law, none of which suggests that that case had been decided wrongly, 
and much of which purports to apply its reasoning,  71  we ought not focus too narrowly 
 65 .  (1854) Kay 711, 717–718; 69 ER 303, 306. 
 66 .  Voyle  v  Hughes (1854) 2 Sm & Giff 18; 65 ER 283. 
 67 .  (1854) 2 Sm & Giff 18, 29; 65 ER 283, 287–288. 
 68 .  (1854) 2 Sm & Giff 18, 28; 65 ER 283, 287. 
 69 .  (1842) 1 Hare 464, 66 ER 1114. As Buckley J explained, the statements as to valuable consideration 
being necessary for a valid equitable assignment to be effected apply only to assignments of future expectancies 
(as was in issue in  Meek v  Kettlewell ), and not presently-existing entitlements (as was in issue in  Kekewich  v 
 Manning ):  Re Ellenborough [1903] 1 Ch 697, 700. 
 70 .  In Part II.C. As to whether trust benefi ciaries who constitute bare sub-trusts “drop out”, see CH Tham, 
“Exploding the myth that bare sub-trustees drop out” (2017) TruLI 31. 
 71 .  For further examples, see  Re Flavell (1883) 25 Ch D 89, 93 (North J, aff’d on other grounds);  Re 
Walhampton Estate (1884) 26 Ch D 391, 395 (Kay J);  Re Spark's Trusts [1904] 1 Ch 451, 454 (Kekewich J, 
appeal compromised). 
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on language which, on the surface, appears to suggest that such assignments do not 
entail a trustee-benefi ciary relationship between assignor and assignee at all, since any 
case purporting to follow  Kekewich v Manning must accept that the relationship between 
equitable assignor and assignee entails something akin to a trustee-benefi ciary relationship. 
 But what of authorities pre-dating  Kekewich v Manning ? 
 (c) Prior authorities (apparently) denying the “trust effect” 
 There are some authorities pre-dating  Kekewich v Manning which seem to suggest that the 
equitable assignor of an equitable interest or chose has “no interest” after the assignment. 
For example, in  Fulham v McCarthy ,  72  where the assignor and assignee of an equitable 
interest arising under a will had joined together as co-plaintiffs in a suit against the 
testamentary trustees under that will, the House of Lords non-suited the proceedings on 
grounds of misjoinder. In particular, Lord Cottenham LC  73  noted that:  74  
 “The position of the parties is this:—If the transaction between the sister and the religious house 
be a valid transaction, then the bill ought to have been fi led by the trustees of the religious house. It 
is not an assignment of a legal right, it is an assignment in equity of a purely equitable interest; in 
which case, as [counsel for the co-plaintiffs] very properly admitted at the bar, the course of practice 
of Courts of Equity is to fi le a bill, not by the assignor, who, if the assignment be valid, has no longer 
any interest in the property assigned, but by the party claiming as assignee.” 
 But reading on, we see the following:  75  
 “If the assignees, that is, the trustees of the religious house, had fi led a bill, then the defendant would 
have an interest in the question on the issue, because every defendant has an interest in shewing that 
the party sueing him has no interest in the subject-matter of the suit; and it would be a perfectly valid 
course of defence to shew that this deed was not a deed which a Court of Equity could recognise as 
giving a benefi cial interest to the party claiming under it.” 
 Lord Cottenham’s reference to benefi cial interest in this passage is telling. It would have 
been redundant if the grantor under the deed had truly retained no interest at all, post-
assignment. Read in full,  Fulham v McCarthy did not turn on the wholesale extinction 
of the assignor’s interest in the subject matter that had been equitably assigned. Rather, 
the House of Lords recognised that the effect of the assignment, if valid, was to pass the 
assignor’s benefi cial equitable interest. 
 What, then, of Lord Cottenham’s even earlier speech  76  in  Cator v Croydon Canal Co ,  77  
which made no reference to benefi cial interests at all? Taken at face value, that speech 
would have been contradicted by his later speech in  Fulham v McCarthy . So on one view, 
the later House of Lords decision in  Fulham v McCarthy must have overruled any contrary 
view in  Cator . Alternatively, Lord Cottenham might be taken to have used “interest” 
consistently in both  Cator and  Fulham v McCarthy to refer to benefi cial interest. 
 72 .  (1848) 1 HLC 708. 
 73 .  During his second term as Lord Chancellor. 
 74 .  (1848) 1 HLC 708, 717–718 (emphasis added). 
 75 .  (1848) 1 HLC 708, 718 (emphasis added). 
 76 .  During his fi rst term as Lord Chancellor. 
 77 .  See  ante , text to fn.41. 
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 On either view, by the time  Fulham v McCarthy was decided, if an equitable assignment 
extinguished anything, it extinguished merely the assignor’s benefi cial interest. As such, 
the assignor’s equitable entitlements associated with the subject matter of the assignment 
could not have been divested from her, though she would no longer be privileged to invoke 
them for her own benefi t: by such equitable assignment, she would have become obligated 
to her assignee in a manner akin to that between a trustee and her benefi ciary. These 
cases are, therefore, consistent with the trust-based conclusion subsequently reached in 
 Kekewich v Manning . 
 However, that is not to say that equitable assignments entail only a trust. 
 C. The “agency effect” 
 The trust effect, in isolation, cannot explain how an equitable assignee may deal with the 
obligor to the chose assigned without judicial order in a manner as would be recognised 
and be given effect to by a court (as Jenkins LJ had said in  Re McArdle  78  ). It has been 
suggested that the “trust effect” entailed by equitable assignments is supplemented by 
an “agency effect”, whereby the assignee is empowered or “authorised” to invoke the 
assignor’s entitlements against the obligor to the chose assigned as the assignee pleased.  79  
This unusual form of agency whereby the assignor’s entitlements arising from the chose 
assigned are delegated by the assignor to her assignee to invoke in the assignor’s place, 
coupled with a release from the usual fi duciary obligations of an agent-delegatee to invoke 
such delegated powers for the benefi t of the principal, explains how an assignee may 
appear to have stepped into the assignor’s shoes: he may invoke the assignor’s entitlements 
not because he has taken her place, but because he is invoking those entitlements as her 
delegatee/agent.  80  
 Such agency reasoning demonstrates that a substitutive conception of equitable 
assignment is not the only way to explain how an equitable assignee may invoke his assignor’s 
entitlements arising from the chose assigned. Furthermore, unlike the substitutive model, 
which cannot be reconciled with the cases that tell us that equitable assignments of legal 
or equitable choses in action entail a trustee-benefi ciary relationship between assignor 
and assignee, the agency effect posited above is not intrinsically opposed to that trustee-
benefi ciary relationship. Rather, the combination of “trust” and “agency” effects allow 
equitable assignments to simulate a substitution of the assignee for the assignor through 
the ceding of control over the invocation of the entitlements in question from the assignor 
to the assignee. Admittedly, the combination of trust and agency effects does not explain 
how equitable assignees of equitable choses are permitted to commence proceedings 
(necessarily in the court’s equitable jurisdiction) in their own names against the obligor 
to the chose in question, without any need to join the assignor: surely, as “agents”, such 
proceedings would still have to be brought in the names of their “principals”? As the 
 78 .  See  supra , fn.40. 
 79 .  See  Tham (2016a) , and  Tham (2016b) , Chs III and V. 
 80 .  The Romans also simulated substitutive transfer effects using similar agency reasoning. “Again, as in the 
common law, rights under contract were unassignable and the device was hit upon of appointing the intended 
assignee my representative (mandatary) to sue on my behalf, with exemption from any obligation to account, 
 procurator in rem suam ”: WW Buckland and AD McNair,  Roman Law & Common Law: A Comparison in 
Outline , 2nd edn (revised by FH Lawson) (University Press, Cambridge, 1952), 309. 
©I
nf
or
m
a 
nu
ll -
 1
7/
12
/2
01
8 
08
:0
1
 JOINDER OF EQUITABLE ASSIGNORS 549
© Informa UK plc. No unauthorised copying or sharing of this document is permitted
following will show, the reason why such proceedings may be brought in the name of the 
assignee without need for joinder of the assignor lies in the application of the rules of  res 
judicata in proceedings within the court’s equitable jurisdiction, given such agency and/
or trust effects. 
 III. BEING “BOUND” BY A DECISION: ESTOPPEL BY  RES JUDICATA 
 Where an equitable assignee of the benefi t of a common law chose in action is able to bring 
legal or equitable proceedings against the obligor to such chose, joinder of the assignor 
to those proceedings is required,  81  though whether such joinder is required as a matter of 
procedure, or as a substantive requirement, is confused. 
 In  Durham Brothers v Robertson ,  82  Chitty LJ hinted at the doctrinal basis why joinder 
of the assignor of a common law chose in proceedings in the court’s equitable jurisdiction 
might be required: 
 “[A]n ordinary debt or [legal] chose in action before the Judicature Act was not assignable so as to 
pass the right of action at law, but it was assignable so as to pass the right to sue in equity. In his suit 
in equity the assignee of a debt, even where the assignment was absolute on the face of it, had to 
make his assignor, the original creditor, party in order primarily to bind him and prevent his suing at 
law, and also to allow him to dispute the assignment if he thought fi t.” 
 This passage highlights that a claimant such as an equitable assignee of the benefi t of debt 
arising out of a contract may bring himself within the equitable jurisdiction of a court so 
as to seek a remedy within that equitable jurisdiction with regard to the common law debt. 
If that be correct, Chitty LJ’s speech provides the germ of a solution to the conundrum 
posed by  Brandt’s . 
 The following will demonstrate that, where a common law chose has been equitably 
assigned, the rules of res judicata dictate that: 
 (1) the assignor will be issue estopped in subsequent proceedings within the court’s 
equitable jurisdiction in relation to issues decided in prior proceedings initiated by her 
assignee, even if the assignor had not been joined as a party thereto; but 
 (2) the assignor will not be issue estopped in subsequent proceedings within the court’s 
common law jurisdiction in relation to issues decided in prior proceedings initiated by 
her assignee, although she would be bound if she were joined as a party thereto. 
 These differences arise because the court, when acting within its equitable jurisdiction, 
would both recognise and enforce the trust and agency effects entailed by equitable 
assignment. However, when acting within its common law jurisdiction, it would only 
recognise, but not enforce these effects. 
 81 .  See, eg,  Gibson  v  Winter (1833) 5 B & A 96; 110 ER 728 (Denman CJ);  Durham Brothers  v  Robertson 
[1898] 1 QB 765, 769–770 (Chitty LJ);  Performing Right Society Ltd  v  London Theatre of Varieties Ltd [1924] 
AC 1, 15 (Viscount Cave LC), 20 (Viscount Finlay) and 32 (Lord Phillimore);  Williams  v  Atlantic Assurance Co 
Ltd (1932) 43 Ll L Rep 177, 186 and 188; [1933] 1 KB 81, 100 and 105 (Greer and Slesser LJJ, respectively). 
 82 .  [1898] 1 QB 765, 769–770 (emphasis added). AL Smith and Collins LJJ agreed with Chitty LJ on this 
point. 
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 A. Distinguishing between recognition and enforcement 
 As Professor Dicey observed:  83  
 “A Court recognises a right when for any purposes the Court treats the right as existing … 
 A Court enforces a right when giving the person who claims it either the means of carrying it into 
effect, or compensation for interference with it.” 
 English courts do not merely recognise and/or enforce foreign judgments: the distinction 
has also been applied to substantive principles and rules of English domestic law.  84  Even 
today, a court in its equitable jurisdiction will “recognise” and “enforce” the equitable 
principles and rules pertaining to the equitable institution of equitable assignment, though 
the position when acting within its common law jurisdiction is not quite the same. 
 Prior to the administrative reforms enacted via the Judicature Act 1873,  85  pre-Judicature 
Act courts of common law would recognise the equitable interest arising from an 
assignment or a trust in certain contexts. For example, since  Scott v Surman ,  86  the courts 
of common law had recognised that only property that was benefi cially held by a bankrupt 
would pass to his assignees in bankruptcy pursuant to the bankruptcy legislation in force 
at the time.  87  Thus, a court of common law (or, post-Judicature Act, the court, when 
acting within its common law jurisdiction) would give limited effect to these equitable 
institutions by allowing for certain pleas by way of defence, or by way of avoidance. But 
the withholding of a common law remedy despite the common law courts’ recognition 
of equitable conceptions such as the benefi cial interest arising under a trust meant non-
enforcement of such equitable entitlements,  88  enforcement of such equitable institutions 
being a matter exclusive to the equity jurisdiction.  89  This continued to be the case, even 
post-Judicature Act.  90  
 83 .  AV Dicey,  A Digest of the Law of England with reference to the Confl ict of Laws (Stevens, London, 1896), 
30. Today, see AV Dicey, JHC Morris and L Collins,  Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Confl ict of Laws , 15th edn 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2012), Rule 41, and [14.002–14.006]. 
 84 .  See  Meyer  v  Aguilar (1798) 7 TR 681, 695–696 (Lord Kenyon CJ, on recognition of Exchequer judgments 
by the Court of King’s Bench). 
 85 .  Which came into force in 1875 pursuant to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875. 
 86 .  (1742) Willes 400; 125 ER 1235. See also  Winch  v  Keeley (1787) 1 TR 619, 623; 99 ER 1284. 
 87 .  For other instances of recognition of equitable conceptions by common law courts, see  Meagher, Gummow 
& Lehane (2015) , [1.200]. 
 88 .  Winch  v  Keeley (1787) 1 TR 619, 622–623; 99 ER 1286 (Ashurst J);  Sinclair  v  Brougham [1914] AC 398, 
420 (Viscount Haldane LC). See also  Re Diplock [1948] 1 Ch 465, 519 (aff’d on other grounds in  Ministry of 
Health  v  Simpson [1951] AC 251). 
 89 .  The proposition that an action at law may not be brought against a trustee for breach of trust is not new. 
See  Foorde  v  Hoskins (1614) 2 Bulst 336, 337–338; 80 ER 1168, 1169 (Coke CJ, ignoring the contrary position 
set out in  Megott  v  Broughton and Davy (1586) BL MS Add 25195 fo.61v; HLS MS 16, fo.338 (reproduced in 
JH Baker,  Baker and Milsom Sources of English Legal History: Private Law to 1750 , 2nd edn (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2010), 532–533; but more commonly cited as  Megod’s Case (1586) Godb 64, 78 ER 40; 4 Leon 
225, 74 ER 836). It seems Coke CJ’s view ultimately prevailed, given North CJ’s observations in  Barnardiston 
 v  Soame (1674) 6 How St Tr 1092, 1107–1108: “It has been adjudged, that an action upon the case will not lie 
for the breach of a trust, because the common law cannot try what a trust is; but if such actions were allowed, 
the law might declare that to be a trust, which the court of chancery, that properly judges of trusts, might say is 
none; and where the common law cannot examine the principal matter, the damages that were but dependant 
upon it shall not be regarded.” 
 90 .  Post-Judicature Act, there is clear authority that where personalty is held on trust, the trust benefi ciary having 
neither legal title to that personalty (nor possession thereof) may not bring an action at law for conversion:  Joseph 
 v  Lyons (1884) 15 QBD 280; cited with approval and followed in  MCC Proceeds Inc  v Lehman Bros International 
(Europe) [1998] 4 All ER 675, 691 (Mummery LJ, with whom Pill and Hobhouse LJJ agreed this point). 
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 In the present context, although a court of common law (or, post-Judicature Act, a court 
acting within its common law jurisdiction) might recognise equitable institutions such 
as equitable assignment, and the trust and agency effects entailed thereby, it would not 
enforce entitlements arising under such institutions by allowing the issue of common law 
originating process with the aim of obtaining a common law remedy on the application of 
an equitable assignee who had not been delegated the authority to bring such proceedings 
in a manner that was consistent with common law doctrine (eg, through the grant of a 
requisite power of attorney, or, at least, explicit words of authorisation to that effect).  91  
In contrast, an equitable assignee of the benefi t of a common law chose arising out of a 
contract would certainly be permitted by a court of Chancery (or, post-Judicature Act, 
the court when acting within its equitable jurisdiction) to seek the issuance of originating 
process seeking an equitable remedy against the obligor to that chose because the agency 
effect entailed by the equitable assignment would be recognised and enforced by such 
court. 
 Accordingly, if a common law remedy was sought against, say, a contractual obligor by 
an equitable assignee, joinder of the assignor would be required for substantive reasons 
arising within the common law of contract (namely, the rules as to privity of contract and 
consideration). However, if an equitable remedy was sought by the equitable assignee 
against such contractual obligor, joinder of the assignor to such proceedings within the 
court’s equitable jurisdiction would not be required for substantive reasons, least of all 
reasons derived from the common law. Yet even so, joinder of the assignor would be 
procedurally convenient in order to bind the assignor to the fi ndings as might be made in 
those equitable proceedings. 
 But can proceedings seeking an equitable remedy be brought by the equitable assignee 
of a contractual debt against the debtor? To demonstrate how this is possible, it is apposite 
to begin with a simpler case. 
 Example 1 : B is in the business of restoring vintage vehicles. A contracts for B to restore 
and refurbish A’s vintage Aston-Martin car. Part of the work involves application of a 
special rust-prevention treatment formulated by B. This is a trade secret of B. 
 B agrees to do the work for a fee of £100,000, of which £10,000 is to be paid in advance. 
However, although there is some discussion as to progress payments, nothing is reduced 
into writing, and A takes the view that the balance £90,000 is only to be paid on re-delivery 
of the car upon full completion of the work. The car is delivered to B’s workshop and, after 
receiving the fi rst £10,000, B begins work, but progress is slow because, as it turns out, B 
has taken on more work than he can handle. 
 Given this, B informs A that he will not be fi nishing the job. A demands to have the car 
returned to her—but B refuses as that would mean the loss of his possessory lien for the 
value of the work already done to improve the car, a sum which B reckons to be as much 
as £60,000. 
 Taking the view that nothing is payable until all work had been completed, A refuses to 
pay the £60,000 demanded by B in exchange for the car’s return. A rejects B’s repudiatory 
 91 .  Originating process issued on the application of one who had no entitlement to do so would be liable to 
be set aside  ab initio . 
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breach and commences equitable proceedings in which she seeks an order of specifi c 
performance against B to compel him to complete the work on the car, or, alternatively, 
to return the car to her on payment of such sum as the court might assess to be due and 
payable in light of the work that had been completed. 
 In Example 1, A declined to accept B’s repudiatory breach and elected to keep the 
contract on foot. So no question of damages at common law arises: A is merely seeking 
an equitable remedy against B. In any event, as A’s Aston-Martin is a unique example of 
this model of car, it would not be feasible for A to seek damages to acquire a replacement 
vehicle. It is thus highly probable that grounds for accessing the court’s equitable 
jurisdiction are present. 
 Now, suppose the following: 
 Example 2 : Suppose that, in addition to the facts set out in Example 1, after contracting 
with B, A sold her Aston-Martin to C and, as part of that contract of sale, also equitably 
assigned to C the benefi t of her contract with B. Next, when B informed A about his 
decision not to carry on with the restoration of the Aston-Martin, and that he would 
relinquish possession of the Aston-Martin only if he were paid £60,000 for what he 
reckoned to have been the value of the work done to date, A, at C’s behest, informed B that 
his repudiation of the contract had been rejected and that he should return the car without 
any further payment. However, as before, B refused to do so. 
 On such facts, might C in Example 2 initiate proceedings in equity against B to compel 
B to either complete the work to be done on the car, or to give up possession of the car 
on terms? As shown in Example 1 , so long as the relevant jurisdictional basis can be 
established, A would have had the power to do so. If so, in Example 2, C would have 
been delegated that power of A’s, given the “agency effect” entailed by A’s equitable 
assignment to C. 
 This begins to explain Chitty LJ’s statement in  Durham Brothers  92  that C may bring 
equitable proceedings against B without joining A as a party thereto—though as Lord 
Sumner warned in  Performing Right Society v London Theatre of Varieties ,  93  no fi nal 
equitable remedy such as an injunction may be ordered without joinder. The following 
elaborates the basis for these developments. 
 B.  Res judicata  and joinder of obligees to equitable proceedings 
 The wisdom of staying equitable proceedings against B until A be joined follows from the 
rules of  res judicata .  94  By those rules, B may successfully invoke “issue estoppel”  95  in any 
subsequent proceedings as might be brought by C or A should the issues decided in prior 
proceedings by C be re-litigated, once B demonstrates that:  96  
 92 .  Reproduced ante, at text following fn.82. 
 93 .  [1924] AC 1, 14; see also 18 (Viscount Finlay) and 28 (Lord Sumner). 
 94 .  Estoppel by  res judicata is a substantive right, and is no mere rule of evidence or public policy:  Johnson 
 v  Gore Wood & Co (a fi rm) [2002] 2 AC 1, 59E (Lord Millett);  Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services 
Ltd  v  European Reinsurance Co of Zurich [2003] UKPC 11; [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 253, [15]. 
 95 .  “Issue estoppel may be a comparatively new phrase, but I think that the law of England … has always 
recognised that estoppel  per rem judicatem includes more than merely cause of action estoppel.”:  Carl Zeiss 
Stiftung  v  Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] AC 853, 913 (Lord Reid). 
 96 .  Handley (2009) , [1.02]. 
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 “(i) the [prior] decision, whether domestic or foreign, was judicial in the relevant sense; 
 (ii) it was in fact pronounced; 
 (iii) the [prior] tribunal had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; 
 (iv) the [prior] decision was– 
 (a) fi nal; 
 (b) on the merits; 
 (v)  it determined a question raised in the later litigation; and 
 (vi)  the parties [in the later litigation] are the same [as the ones in the prior litigation] or their 
privies, [ 97 ] or the earlier decision was  in rem [.]” 
 On the facts in Example 2, requirements (i) to (v) would not be problematic. That leaves 
the fi nal set of requirements in (vi), which will be discussed below. 
 (a) Decision in rem  or in personam? 
 Suppose that C, without acting at anyone’s behest, had commenced proceedings in 
equity against B in his own name and without joining A. And suppose the court in such 
proceedings found on the facts in Example 2 that it had been contractually agreed that 
B would be entitled to progress payments, the quantum of which was to be determined 
conclusively by B’s sole assessment as to the percentage of work done to the car, leading 
the court to dismiss C’s application to an equitable remedy against B. 
 This decision on the issue of progress payments would not be an  in rem decision for  res 
judicata purposes were A to relitigate the point:  98  
 “A decision  in rem conclusively determines the status of a person or thing; that is its jural relation 
to persons generally, not just parties and privies. … It would have been clearer if decisions had been 
classifi ed  inter omnes , and  inter partes …” 
 And, for  res judicata purposes:   99  
 “Status is the ‘legal position of the individual in or with regard to the rest of the community’; ‘the 
condition of belonging to a class in society to which the law ascribes peculiar rights and duties, 
capacities and incapacities’, and ‘a condition attached by law to a person which confers or affects 
or limits a legal capacity of exercising some power that under other circumstances he could not or 
could exercise without restriction.’” 
 Since the decision on the presence/absence of an agreement pertaining to progress payments 
is merely a decision as to B’s legal position with regard to A under the terms of the contract 
between them, that decision does not settle B’s legal position “in or with regard to the rest 
of the community”. Nor is it a decision on the status of a thing since the subject matter of 
the decision is the duties and obligations owed by a person, namely B. Thus, the decision on 
this issue is not a decision  in rem for  res judicata purposes: it is an  in personam decision.  100  
  97 .  “[T]here is no doubt that the requirement of identity of parties is satisfi ed if there is privity between a 
party to the former litigation and a party to the present litigation. … It has always been said that there must be 
privity of blood, title or interest …”:  Carl Zeiss Stiftung  v  Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] AC 853, 910E and 
910G (Lord Reid). 
  98 .  Handley (2009) , [10.01]. 
  99 .  Handley (2009) , [10.05] (references omitted, emphasis added). 
 100 .  That said, the court’s decision on the progress payment issue is not invariably a decision  in personam 
for everyone and for all purposes: see  Pattni  v  Ali [2006] UKPC 51; [2007] 2 AC 85, [37]. But that is beside the 
point for present purposes. 
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 (b) Identity of parties 
 If proceedings at law or in equity were brought by C against B to relitigate the issue as 
to progress payments, C could hardly deny that it was not the same “C” as had brought 
the earlier equitable proceedings. So, all six requirements mentioned above  101  would be 
satisfi ed, and C would be issue estopped by the prior  in personam decision in equity. But 
A would not be issue estopped on the same basis, since A is obviously not C. 
 Had A known that C had initiated proceedings against B, but had been content to “stand 
by and see [her] battle fought by someone else in the same interest”,  102  the courts might 
take A to be bound by the fi ndings therein.  103  However, even absent such knowledge, the 
following will show that A and C may be treated for  res judicata purposes to be one and 
the same, given that C is A’s equitable assignee. 
 As explained above, equitable assignments entail an unusual form of principal-agent 
relationship between the assignor and her assignee whereby the assignor authorises her 
assignee to invoke her (the assignor’s) entitlements arising from the chose assigned as if 
he were the assignor, but as he (the assignee) pleases. The courts treat principals who had 
instructed an agent to bring judicial proceedings in the agent’s own name to be the “real” 
party for whose account or benefi t the party on record was suing or defending. Subsequent 
proceedings by such principals would be liable to be issue estopped, since there would be 
an “identity of parties” between them and their agent.  104  
 So far as a court acting within its equitable jurisdiction was concerned, since it 
would necessarily recognise and give effect to the “agency effect” entailed by equitable 
assignment, it would allow originating process seeking equitable remedies to issue against 
the obligor to the chose assigned on the application of the assignee as the assignor’s 
“delegatee/agent”. Thus, on the facts in Example 2, A would be taken by a court acting 
within its equitable jurisdiction to have “authorised” C in advance to invoke A’s entitlements 
against B, including A’s power to commence judicial proceedings against B, thus enabling 
C to sue B. C’s bringing of the prior equitable proceedings against B without A’s direct 
involvement would then be a matter for which A would be taken to have been responsible 
as “principal”. 
 Given the above, A and C may be taken to be the same party for  res judicata purposes, 
and B could successfully invoke issue estoppel against A if A were to re-litigate the issue 
as to progress payments within the court’s equitable jurisdiction, even if A had not been 
joined to the proceedings brought by C. 
 (c) Privity of interest 
 Equitable assignments of equitable or legal choses also entail a trustee-benefi ciary 
relationship as between assignor and assignee. So not only may A and C be taken to be 
one and the same entity for  res judicata purposes by reason of the “agency effect”, A 
and C might be taken to have suffi cient “privity of interest” as would also trigger issue 
 101 .  Ante , text following fn.96. 
 102 .  Re Lart [1896] 2 Ch 788, 794 (Chitty J). 
 103 .  Handley (2009) , [9.12]. 
 104 .  Handley (2009) , [9.14]. 
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estoppel, at least so far as subsequent proceedings within the court’s equitable jurisdiction 
were concerned. 
 Since an equitable assignor of an equitable chose owes the same kinds of obligations to 
the assignee as a bare trustee would owe to its benefi ciaries,  105  in Example 2, A holds her 
common law entitlements as obligee to her contract with B for C’s benefi t. This is often 
suffi cient to generate a “privity of interest” between A and C:  106  
 “[H]aving due regard to the subject matter of the dispute, there must be a suffi cient degree of 
identifi cation between the two to make it just to hold that the decision to which one was party should 
be binding in proceedings to which the other is party. It is in that sense that I would regard the phrase 
‘privity of interest.’ Thus in relation to trust property I think there will normally be a suffi cient 
privity between the trustees and their benefi ciaries to make a decision that is binding on the trustees 
also binding on the benefi ciaries, and vice versa.” 
 In general, therefore:  107  
 “[t]here is suffi cient privity between persons sued as trustees of a trust and benefi ciaries of that trust. 
So a decision that is binding on the trustees will also be binding on the benefi ciaries, and vice versa.” 
 If so, re-litigation of the issue as to progress payments in subsequent equitable proceedings 
by A against B would be issue estopped, given the trustee-benefi ciary relationship between 
A and C, because of the trust effect: that is, A, as equitable assignor(-trustee), would be 
bound by the fi ndings of the court in the prior equitable proceedings brought by C, as 
equitable assignee(-benefi ciary).  108  
 In Example 2, even if A had not been made party to the prior equitable proceedings 
commenced by C against B, A would be issue estopped in equity with regard to the 
progress payment issue by reason of being in privity of interest with C (due to the trust 
effect) and/or because A would be taken to be one and the same party as C (due to the 
agency effect). However, we must keep in mind that since the chose in action that had been 
assigned to C in Example 2 arose from a contract, proceedings might be brought within 
the court’s common law jurisdiction. Might A be similarly issue estopped at common law, 
absent joinder? 
 C. Identity of parties and privity of interest within the court’s common law 
jurisdiction 
 As explained above, an English court today may still only give effect to (ie, enforce) legal 
and not equitable principles when acting within its common law jurisdiction. 
 105 .  See also references supra, in fn.7. It may be noted that Lord Collins drew no distinction between 
assignments of legal or equitable choses. 
 106 .  Gleeson  v  J Wippell & Co [1977] 1 WLR 510, 515G (Megarry V-C); cited with approval in  Johnson  v 
 Gore Wood & Co (a fi rm) [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL), 32E (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) and  Barakot Ltd  v  Epiette Ltd 
[1998] 1 BCLC 283 (CA), 287–288. See also  Resolution Chemicals Ltd  v  H Lundbeck A/S [2013] EWCA Civ 
924; [2014] RPC 5, [32]. For general discussion, see  Handley (2009) , [9.44]. 
 107 .  Lemas  v  Williams [2013] EWCA Civ 1433, [40] (Arden LJ). See also  Teekay Tankers Ltd  v  STX Offshore 
and Shipbuilding Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 253 Comm;  [2017] 1 Lloyd's Rep 387 , [401] (Walker J). 
 108 .  Sales J has suggested, obiter, that the same might not always be true where the prior proceedings had 
been brought by or against the assignor:  Seven Arts Entertainment Ltd  v  Content Media Corp Plc, Paramount 
Pictures Corp, Viacom International (Netherlands) BV [2013] EWHC 588 (Ch), [81]. 
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 The pre-Judicature Act refusal of common law courts to enforce equitable institutions 
such as equitable assignment was preserved under the Judicature Act 1873 and in the 
legislation that followed.  109  Thus, attempts by A to re-litigate the issue on progress 
payments at law would not be barred by issue estoppel merely on the basis of the agency 
and/or trust effects as underpin the equitable assignment between A and C. 
 However, had A been joined to C’s earlier equitable proceedings, the risk of confl icting 
decisions caused by re-litigation at law of issues previously decided in equity would 
evaporate as the lack of privity of interest or identity of persons at law would no longer 
matter. This, accordingly, is the source of the so-called rule of “procedure” requiring 
joinder of the assignor of a legal chose in action to proceedings brought in the court’s 
equitable jurisdiction, and not necessarily as a matter of course, so as to bind the assignor to 
the court’s fi ndings in those equitable proceedings and preclude their re-litigation at law.  110  
 So far as a court acting within its common law jurisdiction was concerned, if an 
action was brought against a contractual obligor (“B”) concerning alleged breaches of 
its contractual obligations arising from a contract entered into with its obligee (“A”), A’s 
equitable assignment of the benefi ts arising from that contract to an assignee (“C”) would 
not strip A of its status as a contracting party. Nor would it make C any less a stranger to 
that contract. Therefore, absent a novation  111  or a statutory assignment  112  to C, substantive 
common law contract principles would require A to be party to the proceedings at law on 
such contract, since it was A (and not C) who was privy to that contract, and A (and not C) 
who had provided the promissory consideration by way of exchange for B’s promissory 
undertakings.  113  Joinder of A cannot be done away with so far as proceedings at common 
law are concerned. And indeed, where C (as equitable assignee) might be permitted by 
the  Vandepitte procedure to bring proceedings at law against the contractual obligor B, 
that procedure entails a joinder of C’s equitable suit against A to compel A to honour 
her equitable obligations to C pursuant to the equitable assignment between them, to A’s 
common law action against B. 
 What appears to have passed unnoticed in many post-Judicature Act decisions where 
equitable assignees of the benefi t of a common law chose arising out of a contract had 
brought proceedings is that such proceedings may be brought by the assignee within the 
 109 .  See, in particular, the Judicature Act 1873, ss 16 and 23. Section 23 was re-enacted as s.32 of the 
Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, which was repealed by the Senior Courts Act 1981. 
But s.19(2)(b) of the 1981 Act appears to have preserved the position arrived at in the 1925 Act. And, although 
s.19(2)(b) is qualifi ed by s.49, as Lord Hailsham LC explained in Parliament, s.49 merely, “states in a more 
economical fashion the fusion of equity and law … which was originally contained in nine successive sections 
of the old Judicature Acts …”:  Hansard (18 December 1980) 415 HL Deb 1214. 
 110 .  See  Performing Right Society Ltd  v  London Theatre of Varieties Ltd [1924] AC 1, 14; cited with 
approval in  Roberts  v  Gill & Co [2010] UKSC 22; [2011] 1 AC 240, [65]. Etherton LJ (in dicta) has doubted if a 
corresponding rule applies as regards common law proceedings:  Kapoor  v  National Westminster Bank Plc [2011] 
EWCA Civ 1083; [2012] 1 All ER 1201, [30]. 
 111 .  The facts in Example 2 do not support novation. That would entail a fresh contract being reached 
between A, B and C where, in consideration of A agreeing to release B from his obligations under the contract, 
B agreed to be obligated to C with regards the refurbishing of the Aston-Martin. 
 112 .  Pursuant to LPA 1925, s.136(1). This would require the assignment to be absolute and not by way of 
charge, in a writing signed by A, and B to be given written notice thereof. 
 113 .  On the facts in Example 2, C could obtain no statutory entitlement to bring proceedings against B 
pursuant to the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 since the contract between A and B made no 
mention of any third party benefi ciaries. It is therefore unlikely that s.1(3) of that Act would be satisfi ed. 
©I
nf
or
m
a 
nu
ll -
 1
7/
12
/2
01
8 
08
:0
1
 JOINDER OF EQUITABLE ASSIGNORS 557
© Informa UK plc. No unauthorised copying or sharing of this document is permitted
court’s common law jurisdiction (where, even with the aid of the  Vandepitte procedure, 
joinder of the assignor is necessary as a matter of substantive common law doctrine) 
or within the court’s equitable jurisdiction (where joinder of the assignor is required to 
obviate the risk to the obligor of relitigation at law by the assignor).  114  Since joinder of 
the assignor may be mandatory when the proceedings are within the court’s common 
law jurisdiction due to substantive common law principles, but be merely required as 
a matter of “procedural convenience” when equitable proceedings are brought instead, 
determination as to which joinder rule is applicable depends on whether the court’s legal 
or equitable jurisdiction had been invoked. 
 That said, if joinder of the assignor to equitable proceedings brought by her equitable 
assignee was necessitated by a desire to protect the obligor from the risk of double liability 
and the risk of confl icting fi ndings, there seems to be no reason, in principle, why such 
obligor might not waive such protection as Equity afforded absent any other “good 
reasons” to require joinder.  115  Might  Brandt’s then be an instance of such waiver by the 
obligor, as opposed to it having been a case where the common law rules as to joinder had 
been modifi ed? 
 IV. EQUITY’S AUXILIARY JURISDICTION AND THE PRINCIPLE 
IN  KNIGHT v KNIGHT 
 As previously mentioned,  Brandt’s is usually taken to have been decided at common law, 
since the respondent debtor was ordered to pay a fi xed sum of money for the unpaid price 
under a contract of sale. Since the remedy at law in debt would appear to be entirely 
adequate, it is diffi cult to see how the court’s equitable jurisdiction might have been 
resorted to in  Brandt’s . But this hides an error. 
 Inadequacy of the common law’s remedies is not the only route to accessing the court’s 
equitable jurisdiction. As Lord Abinger CB recognised in the Court of Exchequer:  116  
 “[W]here a person takes an assignment of a bond, he has the possession; and though a Court of 
equity will permit him to fi le a bill on the bond, it does not follow that he is obliged to go into a Court 
of equity to enforce payment of it.” 
 To explain how one might “go to a court of equity … to fi le a bill on [a] bond”,  117  such 
bond being a common law debt, we need to appreciate the full breadth of the court’s 
equitable jurisdiction. In particular, we need to consider the principle in  Knight v Knight  118  
that, “[t]he court of equity in all cases delights to do complete justice, and not by halves”. 
 114 .  This cannot occur with legal choses arising from voluntary covenants executed under seal, as “… the 
Court will not execute a voluntary contract; and … the principle of the Court to withhold its assistance from a 
volunteer applies equally, whether he seeks to have the benefi t of a contract, a covenant, or a settlement.”:  Jefferys 
 v  Jefferys (1841) Cr & Ph 138, 141 (Lord Cottenham LC). 
 115 .  For example, the ones mentioned by Viscount Cave in  Performing Right Society ,  supra , in fn.110. 
 116 .  Prosser  v  Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481, 497; 160 ER 196, 202 (emphasis added). The Court of 
Exchequer had both common law and equity jurisdiction until the latter was transferred to the Court of Chancery 
in 1841 by the Administration of Justice Act 1841 (5 Vict, c 5), s.2. 
 117 .  Assignees of common law debts may have been permitted to bring proceedings in equity to compel 
payment of such debts since the 15th century: WT Barbour, “The history of contract in early English equity” in 
P Vinogradoff (ed.),  Oxford studies in social and legal history (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1914), vol.IV, 108–109. 
 118 .  (1734) 3 P Wms 331, 334; 24 ER 1088, 1089 (Talbot LC). 
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 A.  Knight v Knight (1734) 
 Although the court has a concurrent equitable jurisdiction over disputes pertaining 
to the performance and discharge of contractual choses in action, the court’s equitable 
jurisdiction over disputes over contractual choses may arise from other bases:  119  
 “Where relief was sought in the Court of Chancery by a plaintiff suing upon a legal title, and the relief 
did not come within any of the recognised heads of the concurrent jurisdiction, it was only granted, 
according to the principles of the court as laid down in the eighteenth century, either to prevent a 
multiplicity of suits or to prevent an irreparable injury. The cases in which relief was granted were 
said to come under the auxiliary jurisdiction, and, where the Court of Chancery was exercising its 
auxiliary jurisdiction, the court did not itself adjudicate upon the validity of the plaintiff’s claim. That 
adjudication was made by the courts of common law; but the assistance of the Court of Chancery 
was asked either before the adjudication, to keep matters  in statu quo until the rights of the parties 
could be determined at common law, or after the adjudication, to give a more complete remedy to 
the party in whose favour it had been made than he could obtain at common law.” 
 Perhaps the reluctance of the Chancery judges to adjudicate on issues at law was due to the 
different procedural mechanisms available to them on matters of evidence.  120  The common 
law courts had the jury, and could make fi ndings as to contested facts. But though jury 
trial eventually became possible in Chancery,  121  recourse to it seems to have been rare.  122  
Instead, the standard course was to rely on the documents pertaining to the dispute, and 
depositions taken on written interrogatories of the witnesses. Defects with this system 
were numerous.  123  
 However, where the evidence before the court of equity was satisfactory and/or the 
key issues of fact were not disputed, the court might be persuaded not to send the matter 
to be heard at common law for a legal remedy to be granted. Instead, on the principle 
in  Knight v Knight , the court could be prevailed upon to grant a fi nal order in equity 
to settle the entire matter between the plaintiff and defendant and so avoid needlessly 
multiplying proceedings, notwithstanding the availability of an entirely adequate common 
law remedy. Thus:  124  
 “[i]f the court was properly seised of one matter, which was closely connected with another matter 
not usually cognisable in equity, the acknowledged jurisdiction over the one drew to it a jurisdiction 
over the other, although that matter in itself could be properly dealt with in a court of law.” 
 119 .  Ashburner (1933) , 5–6 (references omitted). 
 120 .  There were some pre-Judicature Act attempts to reduce the need to send parties to the courts of law. So 
the Chancery Procedure Act 1852, s.62 empowered the court of Chancery to decide on issues of legal title or 
rights; and the Chancery Regulation Act 1862, s.1 required the court of Chancery to determine all questions of 
law or fact on which the parties’ entitlement to relief depended. 
 121 .  Chancery Amendment Act 1858, s.3. 
 122 .  P Polden, “The Court of Chancery, 1820–1875”, in Sir John Baker (ed),  The Oxford history of the Laws 
of England (OUP, Oxford, 2010), vol.XI, 690: “Most of the judges, evidently with the support of the bar, ignored 
their new powers: only eight jury trials were held in 1859–60 and none at all in 1869–70” (references omitted). 
 123 .  See  Ashburner (1933) , 24. For more detailed accounts of some of the changes effected to the Chancery 
procedure in the mid-1800s with regards taking of evidence, see M Lobban, “Preparing for Fusion: Reforming 
the Nineteenth-Century Court of Chancery, Part II” (2004) 22  Law and History Review 565, 588–589; A Birrell, 
“Changes in Equity, Procedure, and Principles”, in  A Century of Law Reform (Macmillan, London, 1901), 
188–192. 
 124 .  Ashburner (1933) , 42. 
©I
nf
or
m
a 
nu
ll -
 1
7/
12
/2
01
8 
08
:0
1
 JOINDER OF EQUITABLE ASSIGNORS 559
© Informa UK plc. No unauthorised copying or sharing of this document is permitted
 Ashburner cites a number of authorities as examples of this, of which  Pearce v Creswick  125  
is probably the most pertinent. 
 B.  Pearce v Creswick (1843) 
 This case concerned a dispute between Pearce, the administrator of one George Hurst, and 
the Sheffi eld and Rotheram Banking Company. Having placed deposits with the Company, 
Hurst was given two receipts dated 18 August 1837, each stating that the Company had 
received of “George Hurst the sum of one hundred pounds, to be accounted for”.  126  These 
receipts could be surrendered within a year to the Company for cancellation in exchange 
for payment of the capital sum plus interest, or the sums could be left in deposit for a 
further year on issue of further receipts. 
 Hurst died on 21 January 1838, bequeathing the greater part of his property to the 
plaintiff, Pearce. Unfortunately, Hurst’s Company receipts fell into the hands of Hurst’s 
nephew, also named George Hurst. The nephew endorsed the receipts with his name, 
“George Hurst”, and presented them at a branch of the Nottinghamshire Bank. Ignorant 
of the nephew’s personation, the fraudulently endorsed receipts were encashed; and, on 3 
February 1838, they were remitted to the Nottinghamshire Bank’s London bankers. On 5 
February 1838, the Company directed the London bankers to credit the Nottinghamshire 
Bank for the amounts paid, the two receipts having been delivered up to the Company for 
cancellation. But, on 8 February 1838, the Company was informed of Hurst’s death. 
 Letters of administration with will annexed for Hurst’s estate were eventually granted to 
the plaintiff on 21 November 1839. He fi led a bill against the defendant, being the director 
and public offi cer of the Company, seeking discovery of the documents pertaining to the 
debts that had been owed to Hurst. Inter alia, the plaintiff’s bill also prayed that an account 
be taken of such sums as were due on the two receipts, and that the Company be decreed 
to pay the plaintiff (as Hurst’s legal personal representative) such sums appearing due on 
such account. 
 As to the question of jurisdiction, Wigram V-C held as follows:  127  
 “The only remaining question is whether … I ought to send the case to be tried in a Court of law …, 
or decide the whole matter here. … It does not appear to me that there is in this case any need of 
sending the Plaintiff to a Court of law … to try the question whether he is entitled to payment of the 
debt for which the receipts were given, in order to entitle him to delivery up of the receipts. There 
is, in truth, no answer set up to the Plaintiff’s claim, so far as the debt is concerned, apart from the 
mode of recovering it. … I cannot say that there is anything in such circumstances which has, in 
equity, absolved the Defendants from their original liability to pay the debt of which the receipts 
are evidence, or any reason why a Court of Equity should not exercise its jurisdiction to investigate 
a legal question with a view to equitable relief, or any reason why I should not myself decide that 
legal question.” 
 Given the above, Wigram V-C ordered the Company to pay the plaintiff the principal debt 
of £200 and the interest, as well as costs. 
 125 .  (1843) 2 Hare 286; 67 ER 118. 
 126 .  (1843) 2 Hare 286, 286. 
 127 .  (1843) 2 Hare 286, 297–298. 
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 Pearce v Creswick demonstrates that, so long as some part of a dispute was properly 
within the equity jurisdiction (for example, to obtain discovery), and so long as the judge 
was persuaded that there was no good reason to send the matter for trial at law, a judge of 
the Chancery court could make an order in equity to compel the payment of a fi xed sum 
accruing due at law.  128  Since no key issues of fact were disputed in Pearce, and equity’s 
jurisdiction had already been validly invoked, it was apposite for the Vice-Chancellor 
to grant the mandatory injunction sought by the plaintiff, thereby avoiding needless 
multiplication of proceedings. 
 But was this jurisdiction limited to cases where discovery had been sought?  Hammond 
v Messenger  129  suggests not. 
 C.  Hammond v Messenger (1838) 
 In this case, Hammond, an equitable assignee of a debt, sought a decree ordering 
Messenger, the debtor, to tender payment to him. Declining to make the order, Shadwell 
V-C observed:  130  
 “If this case were stripped of all special circumstances, [ 131 ] it would be simply a bill fi led by a plaintiff 
who had obtained from certain persons to whom a debt was due a right to sue in their names for the 
debt.” 
 By this, Shadwell V-C acknowledged that Messenger had already obtained “a right to 
sue in their [the assignors’] names for the debt”, and so did not need equitable assistance 
to obtain such power. That Messenger might already have been granted such authority 
in a manner consistent with common law principles would not be unexpected, since it 
was standard commercial practice whenever legal choses were equitably assigned for the 
assignor to grant suitably worded powers of attorney in tandem with the assignment.  132  
 Certainly, the grant of such a power of attorney might be revoked by the donor thereof. 
But, given the bare trust on which an equitable assignor would hold her entitlements for 
the benefi t of her assignee, the assignee could obtain a decree in equity to enjoin such 
revocation, if threatened. And, if the power of attorney had already been revoked, the 
assignee could obtain a decree in equity to compel a re-grant of such power. However, in 
 Hammond v Messenger ,  133  neither of these were in issue: 
 “It [the Plaintiff’s prayer for relief] then proceeds as follows: ‘or that the Plaintiff may be at 
liberty to use the name of the Defendants, Wilks & Wooler, in an action at law to be brought by 
him against Messenger.’ There is, however, no case stated which shews that Wilks & Wooler 
have at all interfered to prevent, or that they intend to prevent the Plaintiff from using their 
names at law.” 
 128 .  This possibility was mentioned in passing in WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action—Part II” 
(1917) 30 Harv L Rev 449, 456 (text to nn.23 and 24). 
 129 .  (1838) 9 Sim 327; 59 ER 383. 
 130 .  (1838) 9 Sim 327, 332 (emphasis added). 
 131 .  See also  Roxburghe  v  Cox (1881) 17 Ch D 520, 526 (James LJ). 
 132 .  See eg HW Elphinstone,  A Practical Introduction to Conveyancing (William Maxwell, London, 1871), 
206–207. Today, see: HG Beale, L Gullifer and S Paterson, “A case for interfering with freedom of contract? An 
empirically-informed study of bans on assignment” [2016] JBL 203, 223. 
 133 .  (1838) 9 Sim 327, 337; 59 ER 383, 387. 
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 Not only had Hammond already obtained the requisite authority at law to seek the issuance 
of common law originating process against Messenger, the debtor (albeit in the names of 
the assignors, Wilks & Wooler), Hammond had not raised any issues pertaining to any 
interference by Wilks & Wooler with regard to such authority as might require Equity’s 
assistance. Given this, Hammond’s bill had to be dismissed. But matters might have been 
very different. 
 Suppose, however, that no power of attorney had been granted in  Hammond v Messenger . 
If so, no proceedings at law could be brought by the assignee against the debtor without 
joinder of the assignor.  134  Yet even so:  135  
 “[T]he form of assigning a chose in action is in the nature of a declaration of trust, and an agreement 
to permit the assignee to make use of the name of the assignor, in order to recover the possession. 
And therefore, when in common acceptation of a debt or bond is said to be assigned over, it must 
still be sued in the original creditor’s name; the person, to whom it is transferred, being rather an 
attorney than an assignee.” 
 Thus, where the equitable assignment had been for value, the assignee could also bring 
proceedings in equity to compel performance of such agreement, thereby forcing the 
assignor to duly authorise the assignee in a manner consistent with common law principle, 
and the assignee-agent would have standing thereby to commence proceedings against the 
obligor at law. 
 Alternatively, where the equitable assignment had been gratuitous, given the trust 
effect entailed by such assignment, the assignee could bring proceedings in equity to 
compel the assignor to commence proceedings against the obligor at law. So in either 
case, by virtue of the  Vandepitte procedure, such proceedings in equity against the 
assignor (to compel the grant of the requisite authority at law, or to compel the carrying 
out of her duties as “trustee”) might be brought simultaneously with the common law 
proceedings against the obligor.  136  However, there is another option. 
 Pearce v Creswick demonstrates that, once a claimant has accessed the court’s 
equitable jurisdiction in support of proceedings to be brought at law, that court retains 
a discretion to carry on with the proceedings, culminating in the grant of an equitable 
decree which would resolve the dispute, instead of halting the equitable proceedings 
pending fi nal decision at law, if the court was satisfi ed that there was no good reason 
to do so. Since an equitable assignee of the benefi t of a contract may invoke the 
court’s equitable jurisdiction where the assignor was un-cooperative, once within 
that jurisdiction, the court may grant an order, not just to compel the assignor to duly 
authorise the assignee so he could bring proceedings at law against the obligor, or to 
compel the assignor to bring those proceedings at law: the court may be persuaded 
 134 .  As explained in Part III.C. 
 135 .  Blackstone (1765) , 442 (emphasis added). See also:  Coke (1788) , at folio 232b, note (1) by C Butler; 
J Story,  Commentaries on equity jurisprudence, as administered in England and America (Hillard, Gray & 
Company, Boston, 1836), vol.II, § 1040. The point probably predates Blackstone: see T Wood,  An institute of 
the laws of England: or, the laws of England in their natural order, according to common use (Eliz Nutt & R 
Gosling, London, 1720), vol.I, 485. 
 136 .  Joinder of proceedings in equity for hearing together with proceedings at law within a single judicial 
proceeding being the precise result of the administrative fusion wrought by the Judicature Act 1873. 
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to compel the obligor to pay the sums in question to the assignee on the principle in 
 Knight v Knight .  137  
 D.  William Brandt’s v Dunlops (1904) 
 And so we return to the case of  Brandt’s .  138  
 The debt of £3,263 4s. 2d. in  Brandt’s arose and was equitably assigned  139  in 1903, well 
after the Judicature Act 1873 had come into force. But the rules governing the invocation of 
the court’s common law and equitable jurisdictions remained unchanged.  140  Consequently, 
the plaintiff-assignee (Brandt’s) could not have brought an action against the defendant-
debtor (Dunlops) within the court’s common law jurisdiction without joinder of the 
assignor (Kramrisch), since Brandt’s had not provided consideration in support, nor was it 
privy to the contract of sale between Kramrisch and Dunlops. 
 The reports state that Kramrisch had authorised Brandt’s to inform Dunlops that it was 
to tender payment for the goods purchased to Brandt’s. But the reports do not reveal that 
Kramrisch had done anything to authorise Brandt’s at law to bring a common law action 
in debt against Dunlops.  141  
 If Brandt’s had not been authorised at law to bring such common law proceedings, and 
if Brandt’s had been minded to commence common law proceedings against Dunlops, 
pre-Judicature Act, Brandt’s would fi rst have had to bring a suit in equity for an injunction 
to compel Kramrisch to grant it the requisite authority, or to compel Kramrisch to sue 
Dunlops at law. But post-Judicature Act, separate proceedings in Chancery were no longer 
required as both equity and common law jurisdictions were now united within a single 
judicial institution. Accordingly, when Brandt’s began proceedings against Dunlops in 
1903 before Warner J in the High Court, those proceedings might be conceived as having 
been brought within the High Court’s equitable jurisdiction to obtain a suitable injunction 
to overcome the diffi culty of not having been duly authorised to bring common law 
proceedings in accordance with common law principle. 
 As recounted by Lord Macnaghten,  142  with regard to the debt in question: 
 137 .  (1734) 3 P Wms 331; 24 ER 1088. The discussion in the main text has concentrated on the possibility 
of accessing the court’s equitable jurisdiction to obtain an equitable decree compelling the payment of a fi xed 
 liquidated sum, even when the common law remedy of an action of debt is available. However, since a court in 
its equitable jurisdiction may also grant unliquidated damages, given the preservation of the statutory power fi rst 
granted by the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (ie, “Lord Cairns’Act”), it should also be possible to access the 
court’s equitable jurisdiction to obtain an equitable decree compelling the payment of damages pursuant to Lord 
Cairns’ Act, even when the common law remedy of damages is available. 
 138 .  Whose principal facts were set out  ante , text to fn.9. 
 139 .  The House of Lords held that there was a perfectly valid and effective equitable assignment on the facts, 
even if the requirements for a “statutory” assignment pursuant to s.25(6) of the 1873 Act might not have been 
met: [1905] AC 454, 460–461 (Lord Macnaghten, with whom the Earl of Halsbury LC concurred), 463–464 
(Lord James). 
 140 .  As explained ante, text following fn.84. 
 141 .  The words of the written assignment to Brandt’s are reproduced at [1905] AC 454, 456–457. No mention 
is made of any grant of power of attorney to the assignee to bring actions at law on Kramrisch’s behalf to recover 
the debt if unpaid. Neither of the reports of the decision at fi rst instance (1903) 8 Com Cas 174; 90 LT 106), or 
the appeal to the Court of Appeal [1904] 1 KB 387, suggest otherwise. 
 142 .  [1905] AC 454, 457. 
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 “… instead of remitting the sum of 3263l. 4s. 2d. to Brandts, as specially directed by Kramrisch & 
Co, the Dunlop Rubber Company, in compliance with a previous general order from Kramrisch & 
Co, paid the amount by cheque to Kleinwort & Co, who had not fi nanced this particular transaction, 
and had nothing whatever to do with it. Ultimately Brandts wrote to the Dunlops pressing for the 
remittance, which was then overdue. They replied on February 9, 1903, that the amount had been 
paid, and added that they held Kramrisch & Co’s receipt for it.” 
 Given the above, Kramrisch would seem to have issued its receipt despite Dunlop having 
paid “the wrong people”.  143  If so, the debt would still be outstanding.  144  
 It is clear that Dunlops contested neither its indebtedness, nor the fact that Brandt’s had 
not been paid. On the analysis in this article, a fi nal decree could be granted by the court 
within its equitable jurisdiction as to such outstanding debt to resolve the entire dispute 
between the parties, albeit subject to the “procedural rule” requiring stay of such equitable 
proceedings until the assignor be joined thereto as a precaution against the assignor re-
litigating the issues at law. However, once “Dunlops disclaimed any wish to have him 
[Kramrisch or their trustee in bankruptcy] present”,  145  thereby declining the protection 
provided by such “procedural rule”, there was no longer any reason for the House of Lords 
to stay proceedings within the court’s equitable jurisdiction, Brandt’s having come into 
that jurisdiction by reason (we may infer) of its not having previously been authorised by 
the assignor to bring such proceedings at law. 
 As  Pearce v Creswick shows, had the facts in Brandt’s arisen pre-Judicature Act when 
the courts of equity and common law were completely distinct administrative entities, 
the court of Chancery could have ordered Dunlops to pay the sums due on the contract 
for sale to Brandt‘s as assignees of the benefi t of that contract. The same must hold, 
 143 .  Ibid , 461. One surmises the receipt had not been issued under seal because, unless set aside, receipts 
under seal are generally conclusive evidence of payment:  Rowntree  v  Jacob (1809) 2 Taunt 141; 127 ER 1030. 
Receipts not under seal, however, are merely evidence acknowledging that money had been paid:  Skaife  v 
 Jackson (1824) 3 B & C 421, 422; 107 ER 790, 791. 
 144 .  There are faint hints that Dunlops may have tendered further payments to Kramrisch, over and beyond 
the erroneous payment to Kleinwort & Co. 
 Brandt’s counsel throughout the proceedings was JA Hamilton KC, subsequently Lord Sumner. In  Performing 
Right Society Ltd  v  London Theatre of Varieties Ltd [1924] AC 1 (HL), 31, Lord Sumner suggested that, 
“Kramrisch … had already been settled with and the Dunlop Company held his receipt”, referring to counsel’s 
submissions before the Court of Appeal (see [1904] 1 KB 387, 391) and at fi rst instance (see (1903) 8 Com Cas 
174, 177). 
 By equitably assigning the debt to Brandt’s, Kramrisch would have become equitably duty-bound to Brandt’s 
to preserve the legal chose until directed by Brandt’s to execute the bare trust underpinning such assignment. 
Kramrisch would thus have been duty-bound in equity to Brandt’s  not to accept a conforming tender of payment 
without Brandt’s prior approval. If Dunlops had tendered further payment to Kramrisch, Kramrisch’s exercise 
of its power to accept conforming tenders of payment from Dunlops would have enabled Dunlops to discharge 
its debt obligation at law by precise performance, even though such acceptance without Brandt’s prior approval 
would have been in breach of Kramrisch’s equitable duty to Brandt’s not to do so. 
 Such tender by Dunlops to Kramrisch would have been made by Dunlops: (i) with actual knowledge of the 
assignment; and (ii) with deemed knowledge of its ramifi cations (since “ ignorantia juris non excusat ”); but (iii) 
without having made reasonable inquiries which, if made, would have revealed that Kramrisch’s acceptance was 
unsanctioned and would be in breach of Kramrisch’s equitable duty to Brandt’s. Dunlops’ tender would thus have 
 dishonestly assisted in Kramrisch’s breach of duty, for which Brandt’s could seek equitable remedies. If these 
were the facts, the proceedings in  Brandt’s would still have fallen within the court’s equitable jurisdiction where 
joinder of Kramrisch would only have been a procedural requirement. 
 145 .  [1905] AC 454, 462. 
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post-Judicature Act, given the merely conceptual separation between the High Court’s 
equitable and common law jurisdictions entailed by the Judicature Act 1873. 
 Brandt’s is better read as a case where the court was acting within its equitable and 
not its common law jurisdiction. And, within that equitable jurisdiction, there is indeed a 
procedural rule requiring joinder of the assignor where circumstances merited it.  146  Unlike 
 Hammond v Messenger ,  Brandt’s was a case where part of the dispute between assignee 
and obligor suffi ced to bring the assignee within the court’s equitable jurisdiction. Once 
within that equitable jurisdiction, beyond seeking such remedy against the obligee-
assignor as had been the initial basis for accessing that jurisdiction, the assignee might go 
further and obtain an order compelling the obligor to pay the sum owed on the contract 
of sale to the assignee. Since the entirety of such proceedings would have been brought 
within the court’s equitable jurisdiction, the common law’s substantive need for joinder of 
the assignor would no longer be of concern. And, although joinder of the assignor to such 
equitable proceedings might be required if circumstances merited it, such joinder was by 
no means absolutely necessary in every single case. Since the raison d’etre for requiring 
joinder was merely to protect the obligor from the risk of being sued again at law by the 
assignor, as noted above, there appears to be no obvious reason why the obligor might not 
waive the protection joinder would offer. And this, perhaps, is precisely what the House of 
Lords in  Brandt’s held to be the case. 
 V. CONCLUSION 
 Once the differences between the rules of joinder of parties to proceedings within the 
court’s common law or equitable jurisdiction, and the breadth of the court’s auxiliary 
equitable jurisdiction are fully appreciated,  Brandt’s becomes a logical working-out of 
equity’s rules on joinder of assignors to proceedings brought within the court’s equitable 
jurisdiction.  Brandt’s is not, therefore, as incoherent as the editors of  Meagher, Gummow 
and Lehane appear to suggest.  147  
 The analysis herein has, of course, practical implications. 
 First, the cases  148  which have taken  Brandt’s as authority for the proposition that, “when 
a legal chose is assigned, the need to join the assignor is procedural and not substantive”  149  
without regard to the remedies sought require reassessment. As explained in this article, 
the procedural rule requiring joinder is only applicable when the proceedings in question 
have been brought entirely within the court’s equitable jurisdiction, where only equitable 
remedies are sought: though within that jurisdiction, the protection for the obligor provided 
by such procedural requirement for joinder may be waived by the obligor. However, when 
common law remedies are sought, and the court’s common law jurisdiction is relied 
 146 .  Also see  Tolhurst (2016) , 63. 
 147 .  Meagher, Gummow & Lehane (2015) , [6.520]. 
 148 .  Besides the cases cited in fn.16, other examples include:  Three Rivers District Council  v  Governor 
and Company of the Bank of England [1996] QB 292;  Bexhill UK Ltd  v  Razzaq [2012] EWCA Civ 1376; and 
 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG  v  Five Star Trading LLC (The Mount I) [2001] EWCA Civ 68; [2001] 
Lloyd’s Rep IR 460;  [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 597 ; [2001] QB 825. 
 149 .  Smith & Leslie (2013) , [11.35]. 
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upon, joinder of the assignor becomes substantively necessary as a matter of common law 
doctrine: there can be no question of “waiver” of joinder by the obligor in such proceedings. 
 Second, on the analysis in this article, when the assignee of a legal chose brings 
proceedings solely in equity against the obligor, though joinder of the assignor is not 
strictly necessary to bind it, the remedies, being equitable, will be subject to equitable 
defences. Conversely, if common law remedies are sought with regard to breaches of a 
contract whose benefi t had been equitably assigned, joinder of the assignor is indispensable 
as a matter of common law doctrine—though equitable defences would then be irrelevant. 
 Third, some have suggested that equitable assignments of choses in action have evolved 
and left behind the trustee-benefi ciary analysis,  150  and, if that were the case,  Brandt’s 
might well be taken to be support for that view. But, on the reading proposed in this 
article,  Brandt’s cannot be taken to be authority for that view at all. Rather,  Brandt’s is 
entirely consistent with the proposition that equitable assignments entail a trust, once we 
appreciate that equitable assignments also entail an agency effect as arises in a principal-
agent relationship (albeit an unusual one), as well. 
 But, perhaps, the most signifi cant gain is one of conceptual coherence. The analysis 
in this article shows that whether the chose assigned be legal or equitable, equitable 
assignment operates in the same way in either case, and in both, a trustee-benefi ciary 
relationship is entailed (albeit supplemented by an unusual principal-agent relationship). 
As such, the analysis in this article clarifi es our understanding of equitable assignment 
to an extent, showing that it is one institution, not two. Thus if, “the law of equitable 
assignment is a mess”,  151  it is hoped that this reduction in needless multiplication of 
concepts will have helped sort some of it out. 
 150 .  Tolhurst (2016) , [4.07], 67–68. 
 151 .  A Tettenborn, “Equitable assignment and procedural quibbles” (1995) 54 CLJ 499, 501–502. 
